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Abstract
Deep reinforcement learning has learned to play many games
well, but failed on others. To better characterize the modes
and reasons of failure of deep reinforcement learners, we test
the widely used Asynchronous Actor-Critic (A2C) algorithm
on four deceptive games, which are specially designed to pro-
vide challenges to game-playing agents. These games are im-
plemented in the General Video Game AI framework, which
allows us to compare the behavior of reinforcement learning-
based agents with planning agents based on tree search. We
find that several of these games reliably deceive deep rein-
forcement learners, and that the resulting behavior highlights
the shortcomings of the learning algorithm. The particular
ways in which agents fail differ from how planning-based
agents fail, further illuminating the character of these algo-
rithms. We propose an initial typology of deceptions which
could help us better understand pitfalls and failure modes of
(deep) reinforcement learning.
Introduction
In reinforcement learning (RL) (Sutton and Barto 1998) an
agent is tasked with learning a policy that maximizes ex-
pected reward based only on its interactions with the en-
vironment. In general, there is no guarantee that any such
procedure will lead to an optimal policy; while convergence
proofs exist, they only apply to a tiny and rather uninter-
esting class of environments. Reinforcement learning still
performs well for a wide range of scenarios not covered by
those convergence proofs. However, while recent successes
in game-playing with deep reinforcement learning (Justesen
et al. 2017) have led to a high degree of confidence in the
deep RL approach, there are still scenarios or games where
deep RL fails. Some oft-mentioned reasons why RL algo-
rithms fail are partial observability and long time spans be-
tween actions and rewards. But are there other causes?
In this paper, we want to address these questions by look-
ing at games that are designed to be deliberately decep-
tive. Deceptive games are defined as those where the reward
structure is designed to lead away from an optimal policy.
For example, games where learning to take the action which
produces early rewards curtails further exploration. Decep-
tion does not include outright lying (or presenting false in-
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formation). More generally speaking, deception is the ex-
ploitation of cognitive biases. Better and faster AIs have to
make some assumptions to improve their performance or
generalize over their observation (as per the no free lunch
theorem, an algorithm needs to be tailored to a class of
problems in order to improve performance on those prob-
lems (Wolpert and Macready 1997)). These assumptions in
turn make them susceptible to deceptions that subvert these
very assumptions. For example, evolutionary optimization
approaches assume locality, i.e., that solutions that are close
in genome space have a similar fitness - but if very bad so-
lutions surround a very good solution, then an evolutionary
algorithm would be less likely to find it than random search.
While we are specifically looking at digital games here,
the ideas we discuss are related to the question of optimiza-
tion and decision making in a broader context. Many real-
world problems involve some form of deception; for ex-
ample, while eating sugar brings momentary satisfaction, a
long-term policy of eating as much sugar as possible is not
optimal in terms of health outcomes.
In a recent paper, a handful of deceptive games were pro-
posed, and the performance of a number of planning algo-
rithms were tested on them (Anderson et al. 2018). It was
shown that many otherwise competent game-playing agents
succumbed to these deceptions and that different types of de-
ceptions affected different kinds of planning algorithms; for
example, agents that build up a model of the effects of in-
game objects are vulnerable to deceptions based on chang-
ing those effects. In this paper, we want to see how well
deep reinforcement learning performs on these games. This
approach aims to gain a better understanding of the vulnera-
bilities of deep reinforcement learning.
Background
Reinforcement learning algorithms learn through interact-
ing with an environment and receiving rewards (Sutton and
Barto 1998). There are different types of algorithms that fit
this bill. A core distinction between the types are between
ontogenetic algorithms, that learn within episodes from the
reward that they encounter, and phylogenetic algorithms,
that learn between episodes based on the aggregate reward
at the end of each episode (Togelius et al. 2009).
For some time, reinforcement learning had few clear suc-
cesses. However, in the last five years, the combination of
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ontogenetic RL algorithms with deep neural networks have
seen significant successes, in particular in playing video
games (Justesen et al. 2017) such as simple 2D arcade
games (Mnih et al. 2015) to more advanced games like Dota
2 and Starcraft (OpenAI 2018; Vinyals et al. 2019). This
combination, generally referred to as deep reinforcement
learning, is the focus of much research.
The deceptive games presented in this paper were devel-
oped for the GVGAI (General Video Game Artificial Intelli-
gence (Perez-Liebana et al. 2016)) framework. The GVGAI
framework itself is based on VGDL (Video Game Descrip-
tion Language (Ebner et al. 2013; Schaul 2013)) which is
a language that was developed to express a range of arcade
games, like Sokoban and Space Invaders. VGDL was devel-
oped to encourage research into more general video game
playing (Levine et al. 2013) by providing a language and an
interface to a range of arcade games. Currently the GVGAI
corpus has over 150 games. The deceptive games discussed
in this paper are fully compatible with the framework.
Methods
To empirically test the effectiveness of the deception in ev-
ery game, we train a reinforcement learning algorithm and
run six planning algorithms on each game. The benefit of
working in GVGAI is that we are able to evaluate the same
game implementations with algorithms that require an avail-
able forward model and with learning agents. GVGAI has a
Java interface for planning agents as well as an OpenAI Gym
interface for learning agents (Perez-Liebana et al. 2016;
Rodriguez Torrado et al. 2018; Brockman et al. 2016).
All algorithms were evaluated on each game 150 times.
The agent’s scores are evaluated along with play through
videos. The qualitative analyses of the videos provide key
insights into the causes behind certain scores and into what
an agent is actually learning. The quantitative and qualitative
results are then used for the final analysis.
Reinforcement Learning
To test if these games are capable of deceiving an agent
trained via reinforcement learning, we use Advantage Actor-
Critic (A2C) to learn to play the games (Mnih et al. 2016).
A2C is a good benchmark algorithm and has been shown
to be capable of playing GVGAI games with some success
(Rodriguez Torrado et al. 2018; Justesen et al. 2018). A2C
is a model-free,extrinsically driven algorithm that allows for
examining the effects of different reward patterns. A2C is
also relevant due to the popularity of model-free agents.
Due to the arcade nature of GVGAI games, we train on
pixels with the same setup developed for the Atari Learning
Environment framework (Bellemare et al. 2013). The atari
configuration has been shown to work well for GVGAI and
allows a consistent baseline with which to compare all the
games (Rodriguez Torrado et al. 2018). Instead of tuning
the algorithms for the games, we designed the games for the
algorithms. We use the OpenAI Baselines implementation of
A2C (Dhariwal et al. 2017). The neural network architecture
is the same as the original designed by Mnih et al. (Mnih
et al. 2016). The hyper-parameters are the default from the
original paper as implemented by OpenAI: step size of 5, no
frame skipping, constant learning rate of 0.007, RMS, and
we used 12 workers.
For each environment, we trained five different A2C
agents to play, each starting from random seeds. In initial
testing, we tried training for twenty million frames, and
we found that the agents converged very quickly, normally
within two million frames of training. We therefore stan-
dardized the experiments to all train for five million frames.
One stochastic environment, WaferThinMints, did not con-
verge and might have benefited from more training time.
Planning Agents
For comparison with previous work and better insight into
the universality of the deceptive problems posed here, we
compare our results to planning algorithms. What we mean
by planning agents are algorithms that utilize a forward
model to search for an ideal game state. In the GVGAI plan-
ning track, each algorithm is provided with the current state
and a forward model and it has to return the next action in a
small time frame (40 milliseconds). This time frame doesn’t
give the algorithm enough time to find the best action. This
limitation forces traditional planning algorithms to be some-
what greedy which, for most of these games, is a trap.
In this paper, we are using six different planning algo-
rithms. Three of them (aStar, greedySearch, and sampleM-
CTS) are directly from the GVGAI framework, while the
rest (NovelTS, Return42, and YBCriber) are collected from
the previous GVGAI competitions. Two of these algorithms,
Return42, and YBCriber, are hybrid algorithms. They use
one approach for deterministic games, such as A* or Itera-
tive Width, and a different one for stochastic games, such as
random walk or MCTS. Both algorithms use hand designed
heuristics to judge game states. These hybrid algorithms also
use online learning to bypass the small time per frame. The
online learning agents try to understand the game rules, from
the forward model during each time step, and then use that
knowledge to improve the search algorithm.
Deceptive Games
In our previous work, a suite of deceptive games was created
in order to take a look at the effects that these deceptive me-
chanics would have on agents (Anderson et al. 2018). These
deceptive games were designed in order to deceive different
types of agents in different ways.
From a game design perspective, the category of decep-
tive games partially overlaps with “abusive games”, as de-
fined by Wilson and Sicart (Wilson and Sicart 2010). In par-
ticular, the abuse modalities of “unfair design” can be said to
apply to some of the games we describe below. Wilson and
Sicart note that these modalities are present in many com-
mercial games, even successful and beloved games, espe-
cially those from the 8-bit era.
This section describes some of these games in detail, and
defines optimal play for an agent playing each game. We
focus on four key categories of deception that these games
exploit. We believe these categories represent general prob-
lems that learning agents face and these simple games allow
(a) DeceptiCoins Level 1 
(b) DeceptiCoins Level 2 
(c) DeceptiCoins Level 3 
Figure 1: DeceptiCoins Levels
us to shine a spotlight on weaknesses that model-free, deep
reinforcement learning agents still face. For a more compre-
hensive list of types of deceptions and deceptive games see
Deceptive Games (Anderson et al. 2018).
The following four different categories of deception will
be discussed further in the discussion section: Lack of Hier-
archical Understanding, Subverted Generalization, Delayed
Gratification, and Delayed Reward.
DeceptiCoins (DC)
Game DeceptiCoins, Figure 1, offers an agent two paths
which both lead to the win condition. The first path presents
immediate points to the agent, in the form of gold coins. The
second path contains more gold coins, but they are further
away and may not be immediately visible to a short-sighted
agent. Once the agent selects a path, they become trapped
within their chosen path and can only continue to the bottom
exit. The levels used here are increasingly larger versions of
the same challenge, but remain relatively small overall.
The optimal strategy for DeceptiCoins is to select the path
with the highest overall number of points. For the levels
shown in Figure 1, this is achieved by taking the right side
path, as it leads to the highest total score (i.e., more gold
coins can be collected before completing the level).
Goal The game offers a simple form of deception that tar-
gets the exploration versus exploitation problem that learn-
ing algorithms face. The only way for the learning agent to
discover the higher reward is for it to forgo the natural re-
ward it discovers early on completely. By designing different
sized levels, we can see how quickly the exploration space
becomes too large. At the same time, an agent that correctly
learns, on the short route, about coins and navigation could
then see that going right is superior.
Results The first two levels of DeceptiCoins are very
small, and the agent fairly quickly learns the optimal strat-
egy. However, In level two the agent took several times
longer to discover the optimal strategy, as expected from an
agent that can only look at the rewards of individual moves.
Level 3 proves to be too hard, and the agent converges on the
Figure 2: The first level of WaferThinMints
suboptimal strategy. By comparison, a randomly initialized
agent is very likely to select the easy path, since it starts next
to it, before being forced to move toward the exit.
The training curve for level 3 shows a significant drop in
performance at the beginning of training. The video footage
suggests that the agent learns the concept of the gold coins
and is attempting to collect them all, but fails to understand
that once it takes the easy coin it will become trapped in the
left path. The agent will also move back and forth between
the paths at the beginning of the game, trying to decide.
WaferThinMints (Mints)
Game WaferThinMints is inspired by a scene in Monty
Python’s The Meaning of Life. The game presents the agent
with easily obtainable points, but if the agent collects too
many it will lead to a loss condition. The idea of this game
is to model a situation where a repeated action does not
always lead to the same outcome or has a diminishing re-
turn over time. The levels for this game feature mints which
each award a point when collected and also fill up a resource
gauge on the agent. The level used is shown in figure 2. If
the avatar’s resource gauge (green bar on avatar) is filled,
defined in this case as nine mints, and the agent attempts
to collect an additional mint, then the agent is killed and
a loss condition is reached. Losing the game also causes the
agent to lose 20 points. A waiter (not seen in Figure 2) moves
around the board distributing mints at random. This means
it is possible for an agent to get trapped while the waiter
places mint on the agent’s square, forcing the agent to eat it.
The agent must, therefore, try to avoid getting trapped.
The optimal strategy is to collect as many mints as pos-
sible without collecting too many, which is currently set as
nine. The player should avoid mints early on and try to avoid
getting trapped. Near the end of the game, the agent should
then eat the remaining mints to get to 9.
Goal WaferThinMints is our primary example of the
changing heuristic deception. The mint goes from providing
a positive reward to giving a substantial negative reward with
the only visual indication being a green bar on the avatar that
represents how full the character is. The agent must learn
that the value of the mints is dependent on that green bar.
Since the bar moves with the Avatar, it cannot just memo-
rize a fixed state in which to stop eating the mints. The mint
is distributed by a chef and left around the board at random.
For the agent to play optimally, it should also learn that it is
not good to get full early on because it might get trapped in
Figure 3: Flower level 1
and forced to eat another mint at some point.
Results As can be seen from the graph, this agent did not
have enough time to converge completely. This points to the
difficulty of learning in the noisy environment where even a
good strategy could result in a bad reward if the agent is un-
lucky. This is necessary though, as in a simpler environment
with a fixed mint layout, the agent would learn to memorize
a path that results in a perfect score. The agent shows some
improvement over time but still plays very poorly.
By observing the agent, we see that the agent uses loca-
tion to solve this problem. At the beginning of the episode,
the agent rushes to the room where the initial mints are
placed. This is a guaranteed source of rewards. The agent
will mostly stay in the room, a safe place, unless chased
out by the chef’s mint placement. After the initial mints, the
agent attempts to avoid mints until it’s trapped by them.
It is not clear whether the agent understands its fullness
bar or uses the amount of mints placed in the game to as-
sess the risk of eating more mints. The agent seems to have
learned that the mints become dangerous, but it seems to use
strange state and location information to help it know when
to eat mints. This is related to the behavior we see in the
game Invest. It also is incapable of reasoning about waiting
until the end of the game to eat mints when it is safer to eat,
an instance of the delayed gratification deception.
Flower (Flow)
Game Flower is a game which rewards patient agents by
offering the opportunity to collect a small number of points
immediately, but which will grow larger over time the longer
it is not collected. As shown in figure 3, a few seeds are avail-
able for the agent to collect, which are worth zero points.
The seeds will eventually grow into full flowers and their
point values grow along with them up to ten points. Once a
flower is collected, another will begin to grow as soon as the
agent leaves the space from which it was collected.
The optimal strategy for Flower is to let the flowers grow
to their final stage of development before collecting them.
Goal In Flower, an agent is rewarded every time it collects
a flower. To get maximum points the agent should collect
each flower the moment it matures to 10 points. This will
provide a better score than constantly collecting seedlings.
Results The training graph for this game shows the agent
falling for the specific deception with the sudden drop-off in
performance. As the agent gets better at knowing where the
flowers are, the score starts to improve. Then the agent gets
Figure 4: Invest level 1
too good at collecting the flowers, and they no longer have a
chance to grow, lowering the score. Watching agent replays
further confirms this, the agent finds a circuit through all the
flowers and then gets better at quickly moving through this
circuit. The agent perfectly falls for the deceit and has no
way back unless it ignores the immediate rewards.
Invest (Inv)
Game Invest is a game where agents can forgo a portion of
their already accumulated reward, for the benefit of receiv-
ing a larger reward in the future. The level used is shown
in figure 4. The agent begins with no points but can col-
lect a small number of coins around the level to get some
initial amount. These points can then be “spent” on certain
investment options. Doing this will deduct a certain number
of points from the agent’s current score, acting as an imme-
diate penalty, but will reward them with a greater number
of points after some time has passed. The agent has several
different options on what they can invest in, represented by
the three human characters (referred to as bankers) in the
top half of the level. Each banker has different rules: Green
banker turns 3 into 5 after 30 ticks, Red turns 7 into 15 after
60 ticks, and Blue turns 5 into 10 after 90 ticks. The agent
can decide to invest in any of these bankers by simply mov-
ing onto them, after which the chosen banker will take some
of the agent’s points and disappear, returning a specific num-
ber of timesteps later with the agent’s reward. The agent will
win the game once the time limit for the level expires.
The optimal strategy for Invest is defined as successfully
investing with everyone as often as possible.
Goal Invest is a game where the agent has to intentionally
seek some negative reward to get a positive reward, and then
wait for a certain amount of time to get the positive reward.
This delayed reward makes it very difficult for the reinforce-
ment learning algorithm to assign credit to a specific assign-
ment. The initial investment will only be assigned a negative
reward, and the agent then has to figure out that the reward
that happens later should also be assigned to this action.
In this case, the reward is deterministic, and the challenge
could be increased further by making the delay stochastic.
Results The agent learns a very particular strategy for all
five instances of training. The agent first collects all the coins
and then invests with the Green Banker. From there it runs
to the far right corner and waits, some agents always choose
the top while others choose the bottom. As soon as the Green
banker returns, the agent runs back over and reinvests only
to run back to its corner and wait. This at first seems like
Agent DC 1 DC 2 DC 3 Inv Flow Mints
aStar 3.36 3.54 1.33 17.53 604.99 1.92
greedySearch 5.0 3.0 1.23 1.0 6.83 -5.15
sampleMCTS 2.0 2.0 1.99 3.5 392.73 5.73
NovelTS 2.1 2.0 2.0 4.8 298.51 8.75
Return42 5.0 2.0 2.0 190.12 329.73 -2.66
YBCriber 5.0 4.0 4.0 10.91 300.73 5.2
A2C 5.0 3.79 2.0 69.6 228.86 -6.21
Table 1: Average score for different games using different agents.
Darker blue entries have higher positive score values for that game
between all the agents, while darker red entries have higher nega-
tive score values.
puzzling behavior as a better strategy would be to sit next to
the Green Banker and be able to reinvest faster and collect
more points. On closer inspection, it becomes apparent that
the time it takes the agent to reach the far corner correlates
with the arrival of the delayed reward. It appears that the
agent learned that investing in the Green Banker and then
touching the far tile resulted in a large positive reward.
The size of the game board allowed the agent to embody
the delay through movement and predict the arrival of the
reward through how long it takes to walk across the board. It
is possible that the agent would have learned to invest with
the other bankers if the board was larger so the agent could
have found a location associated with the delayed reward.
The training graph shows an interesting story too. The ini-
tial random agent would accidentally invest with all three
bankers and get a fairly high score despite not consistently
investing with anyone. The agent quickly learns to avoid the
negative reward associated with the bankers and its score
drops. It stops investing with the Blue Banker first, then the
Red, and finally the Green. After it discovers how to predict
the delayed reward for the Green Banker, it starts doing this
more regularly until its performance converges.
Comparison with planning algorithms
In this section we want to compare the results from some of
the planning agents in the previous paper (Anderson et al.
2018) with the deep RL results in this paper. Table 1, shows
the average score respectively for all the games using six dif-
ferent planning agents and the trained reinforcement learn-
ing agents. Every agent plays each game around 150 times,
and the average score is recorded. These are drastically dif-
ferent algorithms from A2C, but they provide context for
how different algorithms are affected by our deceptions.
While the planning agents perform slightly better on av-
erage, this depends highly on what exact planning algorithm
we are examining. The planning algorithms have an advan-
tage over the reinforcement learning algorithm as they have
a running forward model that can predict the results of each
action. On the other hand, the small time frame (40 millisec-
onds), for deciding the next action, doesn’t give the algo-
rithm enough time to find the best action.
In an important way, both RL and planning are facing a
similar problem here. In both cases, the algorithms can only
query the game environment a limited amount of times. This
makes it impossible to look at all possible futures and forces
the algorithms to prioritize. While most planning agents en-
tirely rely on the given forward model, some, such Return42,
also use online learning. These agents initially play with the
forward model but will try to learn and generalize the game
rules while playing. As the game progresses, they rely more
and more on those learned abstractions. In general, this is
an efficient and smart strategy but makes them vulnerable
to deceptions where the game rules changed in the middle
of the game, such as in Wafer Thin Mints. Here the agents
might get deceived if they do not verify the result using the
forward model. This is very similar to the problem that A2C
encounters since the network representation is tries to gen-
eralize the states of the game.
In summary, while the best planning agents seem to be
stronger than A2C, they also are subject to different forms
of deceptions, dependent on how they are implemented.
Discussion
In summary, while the A2C deep reinforcement learn-
ing(Mnih et al. 2016) approach performs somewhat well, it
rarely achieves the optimal performance in our games and is
vulnerable to most deceptions discussed here. In contrast,
the A2C algorithm performs quite well across the board
for different AI benchmarks and can be considered com-
petitive (Arulkumaran et al. 2017; Justesen et al. 2017). It
should also be noted that the fast-moving field of deep re-
inforcement learning has already produced numerous mod-
ifications that could potentially solve the games discussed
here(Arulkumaran et al. 2017). However, instead of dis-
cussing possible modifications to overcome any particular
challenge presented here, we want to take a step back and
refocus back on the point of this exercise. We are interested
in deceptions to gain a better understanding of the general
vulnerabilities of AI approaches, and try to gain a more sys-
tematic understanding of the ways deep learning in particu-
lar, and AI, in general, might fail. With the previous games
as concrete examples in mind, we now want to discuss four,
non-exhaustive, categories for deception.
Types of Deception
Lack of Hierarchical Understanding The DeceptiCoin
games are relatively easy to solve if one thinks about them
at the right level of abstractions. DeceptiCoins can be seen as
a single binary decision between one path and another. Once
this is clear, one can quickly evaluate the utility of choosing
the correct one and pick the correct path. The deceptive el-
ement here is the fact that this is presented to the AI as an
incredibly large search space, as it takes many steps to com-
plete the overall meta-action. Humans are usually quite good
at finding these higher levels of abstraction, and hence this
problem might not look like much of a deception to us - but
it is pretty hard for an AI. The large search space, paired with
the assumptions that all actions along the path of the larger
action matter, makes it very hard to explore all possible steps
until a possible reward is reached. This is a similar problem
to the famous problem in Montezuma’s Revenge, where the
AI could not reach the goal, and its random exploration did
not even get close. This problem was only recently solved
with forced exploration (Ecoffet et al. 2019).
Finding a good hierarchical abstraction can actually solve
the problem. For example, in DeceptiCoins we can look at
the path from one point to another as one action - something
that has been explored in GVGAI playing agents before.
Subverted Generalization Wafterthinmints is a game
specifically designed to trick agents that generalize. Agents
that simply use a forward model to plan their next step
perform quite well here, as they realize that their next ac-
tion will kill them. But in general, we do not have access
to a forward model, so there is a need to generalize from
past experience and use induction. The fact that each mint
up to the 9th gives a positive rewards reinforces the idea
that eating a mint will be good. The 10th mint then kills
you. This is not only a problem for reinforcement learning,
but has been discussed in both epistemology (Hume 1739;
Russell 1912) and philosophy of AI - with the consensus
that induction in general does not work, and that there is not
really a way to avoid this problem. The subverted general-
ization is also a really good example of how more advanced
AIs become more vulnerable to certain deceptions. On aver-
age, generalization is a good skill to have and can make an
AI much faster, up to the point where it fails.
Delayed Reward The big challenge in reinforcement
learning is to associate what actions lead to the reward (Sut-
ton 1992). One way to complicate this is to delay the pay-
ment of this reward, as we did in the example of invest. The
player first has to incur a negative reward to invest, and then,
after a certain amount of time steps gets a larger positive re-
ward. The RL agent had two problems with Invest. First, it
only ever invests with the investor with the shortest repay-
ment time. The Red Banker would, overall, offer the best
payout, but the RL agent either does not realize this rela-
tionship, or does not associate the reward correctly.
Furthermore, the RL agents also seems to be learning
“superstitions”. When we examined the behaviour of the
evolved RL agent, we see that the agent invests with the
Green Banker and then runs to a specific spot in the level,
waiting there for the reward payout. This behaviour is then
repeated, the agent runs to the banker and then back to the
spot to wait for its reward. We reran the training for the RL
agent and saw the same behaviour, albeit with a different
spot that the agent runs to. We assume that this superstition
arose because the agent initially wandered off after invest-
ing in the Green Banker, and then received the reward when
it was in that spot. It seems to have learned that it needs to
invest in the banker - as varying this behaviour would re-
sult in no payout. But there is little pressure to move it away
from its superstition of waiting for the result in a specific
spot, even though this has no impact on the payout. In fact,
it makes the behaviour, even with just the Green Banker sub-
optimal, as it delays the time until it can invest again, as it
has to run back to the green banker.
What was exciting about this behavior, was the fact that
similar behavior was also observed in early reinforcement
learning studies with animals (Skinner 1948). Pigeons that
were regularly fed by an automatic mechanism (regard-
less of their behaviour) developed different superstitious be-
haviours, like elaborate dance and motions, which Skinner
hypothesized were assumed (by the pigeon) to causally in-
fluence the food delivery. In our game, the agent seems to
develop similar superstitions.
Delayed Gratification There is a famous experiment
(Mischel, Ebbesen, and Raskoff Zeiss 1972) about delayed
gratification that confronts 4 year old children with a marsh-
mallow, and asks them not to eat it while the experimenter
leaves the room. They are told that they will get another
marshmallow, if they can just hold off eating the first marsh-
mallow now. This task proves difficult for some children,
and it is also difficult for our agent. Flower is a game where
the agent actually gets worse over time. This is because it
initially is not very good at collecting the flowers, which al-
lows the flowers time to mature. The optimal strategy would
be to wait for the flowers to grow fully, and then go around
and collect them. The agent learns the expected reward of
collecting seeds early on but does not realize that this reward
changes with faster collection. When it updates its expected
reward based on its new speed, it forgets that it could get
higher rewards when it was slower. While some of the plan-
ning algorithms perform better here, it is likely that they did
not actually “understand” this problem, but are simply much
worse at collecting the flowers (like the untrained RL agent).
This example demonstrates that we can design a problem
where the AI gets worse over time by “learning” to play.
Conclusion
It appears that deep reinforcement learners are easily de-
ceived. We have devised a set of games specifically to show-
case different forms of deception, and tested one of the most
widely used RL algorithms, Advantage Actor-Critic (A2C),
on them. In all games, the reinforcement learners failed to
find the optimal policy (with the exception that it found the
optimal policy on one level of one game), as it evidently fell
for the various traps laid in the levels.
As the games were implemented in the GVGAI frame-
work, it was also possible for us to compare with tree search-
based planning agents, including those based on MCTS.
(This is very much a comparison of apples and oranges, as
the planning agents have access to a forward model and di-
rect object representation but are not given any kind of train-
ing time.) We can see that for every game, there is a plan-
ning agent which performs better than the A2C agent, but
that there is in most cases also a planning agent that per-
forms worse. It is clear that some kinds of deception affect
our reinforcement learning algorithm much more severely
than it affects the planning algorithms; in particular, the sub-
verted generalization of WaferThinMints. On the other hand,
it performed better than most planning algorithms given the
delayed reward in Invest, even though the policy it arrived at
is bizarre to a human observer and suggests a warped asso-
ciation between cause and effect.
We look forward to testing other kinds of algorithms on
these games, including phylogenetic reinforcement learning
methods such as neuroevolution. We also hope that other re-
searchers will use these games to test the susceptibility of
their agents to specific deceptions.
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